🛡️ InfoSec Blue Team Briefing

📰 Articles Covered

• Gixy-Next: Gixy-Next: NGINX Configuration Security Scanner & Performance Checker - MegaManSec 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  Gixy-Next is an open-source tool designed to scan and harden NGINX configurations, identifying security misconfigurations, hardening gaps, and performance issues. It is a fork of the original Yandex Gixy tool, created to address problems introduced in a subsequent fork (`gixy-ng`) which included AI-generated code and regressions.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The original Gixy tool became unmaintained, leading to the creation of `gixy-ng`. However, `gixy-ng` introduced significant issues such as broken functionality, AI-generated code, and unwanted advertising. Gixy-Next was forked from `gixy-ng` to restore the tool's quality, fix bugs, remove problematic code, and ensure ongoing maintainability. 【1】
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  **Users and administrators of NGINX web servers** are affected by the need for secure configurations. This includes anyone responsible for the security and performance of NGINX setups, from small deployments to large production environments. 【1】
  
  **Security Implications:**
  Gixy-Next helps mitigate a range of security risks by detecting misconfigurations that could lead to:
  * **HTTP Splitting:** Allowing attackers to inject malicious content into server responses. 【1】
  * **Path Traversal:** Enabling unauthorized access to files on the server. 【1】
  * **Host Header Forgery:** Potentially causing cache poisoning or other attacks. 【1】
  * **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF):** Allowing attackers to compel the server to make requests on their behalf to internal or external resources. 【1】
  * **Version Disclosure:** Revealing the NGINX version, which attackers can exploit for known vulnerabilities. 【1】
  * **Denial of Service (DoS):** Including vulnerabilities like regex denial of service (ReDoS). 【1】
  
  **Technical Details:**
  Gixy-Next performs a **static analysis of NGINX configuration files** (`nginx.conf` and any included files). 【1】 It can be installed via pip or uv and run from the command line, accepting a configuration file path or reading from standard input. The tool also supports scanning NGINX configurations exported to a single dump file using `nginx -T`. Additionally, a **web-based scanner** is available at `gixy.io/scanner/` that runs locally using WebAssembly. 【1】 Gixy-Next includes numerous plugins for detecting specific vulnerabilities and offers options to filter checks, skip noisy ones, and control output severity. The output can be formatted as ANSI-colored text or machine-readable JSON. 【1】
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders should be aware that Gixy-Next offers a more **comprehensive security analysis than a basic syntax check** (`nginx -t`). 【1】 It aids in automating security reviews, making it suitable for integration into CI/CD pipelines for continuous auditing. 【1】 The tool is designed for clean code and long-term maintainability, making it a reliable option for hardening NGINX. 【1】 Defenders can use its detailed reports and specific plugin information to understand and remediate vulnerabilities effectively. Contributions to the project, such as bug reports or new plugin suggestions, are welcomed. 【1】
• Regipy MCP: Natural Language Registry Forensics with Claude - DFIR Dudes 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The article introduces **Regipy MCP**, a system that enables natural language querying of Windows registry hives for forensic analysis. This is achieved by integrating the **regipy** Python library with Anthropic's Model Context Protocol (MCP), allowing AI assistants like Claude to interpret and respond to forensic questions posed in plain English.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The development of the Regipy MCP server allows users to interact with registry data using natural language. Instead of manually executing commands or selecting specific regipy plugins, users can ask questions like "What persistence mechanisms exist on this machine?". The system then automatically identifies registry hives, selects and runs the appropriate plugins, and correlates the results.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  This tool is designed for **digital forensic and incident response (DFIR) professionals**, investigators, and security analysts. It aims to simplify and expedite the process of analyzing Windows registry data, making it more accessible to a wider range of users.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  Regipy MCP is not a security vulnerability itself but a tool that significantly **enhances the speed and efficiency of security investigations**. By rapidly identifying critical forensic artifacts such as persistence mechanisms, installed software, user activity, and system timestamps, investigators can more quickly understand the scope and nature of a security incident. The tool can flag suspicious entries, aiding in threat detection and response.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  * **Regipy:** A Python library for parsing registry hives, supporting transaction logs and a plugin system for over 75 forensic artifacts across major Windows registry hives.
  * **Model Context Protocol (MCP):** A standard developed by Anthropic for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data.
  * **Regipy MCP Server:** Provides seven tools for Claude, including `list_available_hives`, `list_available_plugins`, `run_plugin`, `run_all_plugins_for_hive`, `answer_forensic_question` (for natural language to plugin mapping), `get_registry_key`, and `set_hive_directory`.
  * **Plugin Coverage:** The system utilizes over 75 regipy plugins across eight hive types (SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, NTUSER.DAT, SAM, SECURITY, AMCACHE, UsrClass.dat, BCD).
  * **Workflow:** Users ask questions in natural language, and Claude, through the MCP server, identifies and executes the necessary regipy plugins to provide the findings.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders should be aware that **registry analysis, a crucial part of incident response, is becoming faster and more accessible**. This means that forensic investigations can be conducted more rapidly, potentially leading to quicker containment and remediation of security incidents. The conversational interface allows analysts of varying experience levels to extract valuable insights from registry data, improving efficiency and the depth of understanding during investigations.
• MuddyWater: When Your Build System Becomes an IOC - "Jacob" - Synaptic Systems GmbH 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The cybersecurity article details an analysis of a malware sample attributed to **MuddyWater**, an Iranian threat actor associated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The analysis focused on the extensive build artifacts found within the malware's binary, which revealed insights into the actor's development process and operational security (OPSEC).
  
  **What Happened:**
  The investigation began with a `.doc` file containing a macro that reconstructed and executed a Portable Executable (PE) file. This PE file, identified as a **RustyStealer sample**, was compiled using Rust on a Windows environment with the MSVC toolchain. The analysis uncovered numerous build artifacts, including complete source code paths, usernames (such as "Jacob"), and compiler commit hashes. These findings suggest a lack of thorough build sanitization and a prioritization of development speed over OPSEC.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  MuddyWater's operations are primarily focused on espionage and have historically targeted government institutions, critical infrastructure, telecommunications, and various organizations, predominantly in the Middle East and parts of Europe. The RustyStealer sample indicates its use in information-gathering activities.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The presence of detailed build artifacts suggests that MuddyWater may not be implementing stringent build sanitization or metadata stripping in their release pipelines. While this practice poses a risk to the developers, it provides valuable intelligence for defenders. These artifacts serve as persistent identifiers that can be used to cluster campaigns and track the threat actor's toolchain over time, offering more stable indicators than ephemeral infrastructure like command-and-control (C2) domains.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  * **Initial Stage:** A `.doc` file with a VBA macro that decodes and writes an executable to `C:\ProgramData\CertificationKit.ini` before running it.
  * **Payload:** A Rust-based PE executable, compiled natively on Windows using the MSVC toolchain (`x86_64-pc-windows-msvc`).
  * **Development Environment:** Build paths indicate a local Windows development setup with the username "Jacob," rather than a CI/CD pipeline. The Rust compiler version is estimated to be around 1.92.0.
  * **Architecture:** The malware exhibits a modular design, including components for persistence and C2 communication, functioning as a sophisticated implant.
  * **Libraries & Frameworks:** The payload utilizes modern Rust networking libraries (e.g., `reqwest`, `hyper`, `tokio`) for asynchronous operations, TLS via Windows Schannel, and cryptographic libraries (e.g., `cipher`, `ctr`) for secure communication or configuration.
  * **OPSEC:** The build quality indicates a trade-off favoring development speed and convenience over rigorous sanitization, with panic strings, assertion messages, and full source paths remaining in the binary.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders can utilize the detailed build artifacts, such as usernames, compiler paths, library versions, and compiler commit hashes, as strong indicators for threat hunting and attribution. These "fingerprints" are more enduring than IP addresses or domain names, enabling the tracking of MuddyWater's development toolchain and campaigns across different infrastructures. The analysis suggests that MuddyWater's development process is likely ad-hoc or poorly automated, prioritizing rapid iteration over robust security hardening. This provides a unique opportunity to monitor the actor's evolution and operational patterns through their development artifacts 【1】.
• Who Benefited from the Aisuru and Kimwolf Botnets? - The content posted at `https://krebsonsecurity.com/` is controlled by **Brian Krebs**. 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The **Kimwolf and Aisuru botnets** have infected over two million devices, predominantly unofficial Android TV streaming boxes, leading to significant security implications. These botnets are used to launch **distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks** and function as relays for "residential proxy" services, which in turn facilitate ad fraud, account takeover attempts, and mass content scraping. 【1】
  
  **What Happened:**
  The botnets, Kimwolf and Aisuru, have compromised a vast number of devices, primarily unofficial Android TV streaming boxes. They force these devices to participate in DDoS attacks and act as relays for residential proxy services. 【1】
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  The primary victims are users of **unofficial Android TV streaming boxes** that have been infected by the botnets. Additionally, companies and individuals targeted by the DDoS attacks and other malicious activities facilitated by the botnets are affected. Entities that appear to have benefited include **Resi Rack LLC** (a hosting provider), botmasters identified as **Dort and Snow**, and companies like **ByteConnect** and **Maskify** that provided proxy services using the compromised devices. **Friedrich Kraft**, CEO of Plainproxies and co-founder of ByteConnect, is also implicated. 【1】
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The security implications are severe, encompassing large-scale DDoS attacks and the relaying of malicious traffic that supports various cybercrimes. The botnet operators have shown resilience by using the **Ethereum Name Service (ENS)** to maintain control even after their command-and-control servers are taken down. They have also engaged in doxing security researchers. 【1】
  
  **Technical Details:**
  The botnets target **residential proxy software** that is factory-installed on unsanctioned Android TV devices. Kimwolf appears to be an evolution of the Aisuru botnet, sharing code and infrastructure. The operators utilize services like **Resi Rack** for hosting and have been observed using **Discord** and **Telegram** for operational communication. 【1】
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders should be aware that these botnets leverage compromised residential devices, specifically Android TV boxes, for malicious activities. The operators' use of ENS for persistent control and their aggressive tactics, such as doxing, highlight the sophisticated and determined nature of these threats. Understanding the infrastructure and communication channels used by the botnets, such as Discord and Telegram, can aid in detection and mitigation efforts. 【1】
• Researcher’s Notebook: Unpacking ‘pkr_mtsi’ - ReversingLabs 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The cybersecurity article details the **`pkr_mtsi` packer**, a malicious tool observed since April 2025 and actively used in malvertising and SEO-poisoning campaigns. It disguises itself as legitimate software installers to gain initial access and deliver various malware payloads.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The `pkr_mtsi` packer is distributed through fake software download websites that are optimized to rank highly in search engine results. These sites offer trojanized installers for popular utilities such as PuTTY, Rufus, and Microsoft Teams, tricking users into downloading malware.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  **Users** who download software from these deceptive websites are directly impacted, as they inadvertently install malicious software. Consequently, **organizations** can suffer from the subsequent malware infections that `pkr_mtsi` facilitates.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The primary security implication is that `pkr_mtsi` serves as a versatile initial access vector for attackers. It enables the distribution of multiple malware families, including Oyster, Vidar, and Vanguard Stealer. The packer's continuous evolution, incorporating advanced obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques, makes it difficult for security solutions to detect and analyze, allowing it to bypass defenses and maintain a presence on compromised systems.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  The packer exhibits several technical characteristics:
  - **Distribution Method:** It masquerades as legitimate software installers and is spread via fake websites.
  - **Evolutionary Sophistication:** Over an eight-month period, it has developed more complex obfuscation, anti-analysis features, and evasive API resolution strategies.
  - **Memory Allocation:** Earlier versions used `VirtualAlloc`, while later versions employ an obfuscated `ZwAllocateVirtualMemory`.
  - **Payload Reconstruction:** Payloads are reassembled from small encoded chunks written into allocated memory.
  - **API Resolution:** It uses hashed identifiers and traverses the Process Environment Block (PEB) to resolve DLLs and APIs, avoiding plaintext strings.
  - **Evasion Techniques:** Includes junk calls to GDI API functions, anti-debugging traps (like infinite loops triggered by `IsDebuggerPresent`), and modifications to UPX modules by removing headers and magic values.
  - **Execution Forms:** It can function as both an executable (EXE) and a dynamic-link library (DLL). DLL variants can be used for persistence by exporting `DllRegisterServer` for execution via `regsvr32.exe`.
  - **Modified UPX:** The second stage of the packer is a modified UPX module with parts removed to evade detection, hindering static analysis and automated unpacking.
  - **Programming Flaw:** A bug in its `NtProtectVirtualMemory` calls, using invalid protection flags, generates detectable errors.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders can implement several strategies to counter `pkr_mtsi`:
  - **Behavioral Detections:** Focus on early execution patterns, such as deterministic memory allocation followed by numerous small writes, obfuscated `ZwAllocateVirtualMemory` calls, unusual PEB traversal for API resolution, and excessive, non-functional GDI API usage.
  - **Exploiting Flaws:** The `NtProtectVirtualMemory` flaw with invalid protection flags provides a high-signal detection opportunity for EDR and telemetry-based systems.
  - **Understanding Staged Architecture:** Recognizing the packer's staged nature can aid in analysis and detection.
• Call for papers: AI-driven threat detection and response Collection - Springer Nature Group 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The article announces a "Call for papers: AI-driven threat detection and response Collection" by *Scientific Reports*. This initiative seeks to gather original research on the development of advanced, collaborative, multi-agent autonomous defense frameworks for cybersecurity.
  
  **What happened:** A new collection is being launched to focus on AI-driven threat detection and response in cybersecurity.
  
  **Who is affected:** This call for papers is relevant to researchers, academics, and industry professionals working in the field of cybersecurity, particularly those focused on artificial intelligence and autonomous defense systems.
  
  **Security implications:** The collection aims to advance the field of cybersecurity by exploring AI-driven methods for threat detection and response. This could lead to more robust and efficient defense mechanisms against evolving cyber threats.
  
  **Technical details:** The focus is on developing collaborative, multi-agent autonomous defense frameworks. This implies research into how multiple AI agents can work together to detect and respond to threats in a coordinated and autonomous manner.
  
  **What defenders should know:** Defenders should be aware of the growing role of AI in cybersecurity. This collection highlights the ongoing research into AI-driven threat detection and response, suggesting that future defense strategies will likely incorporate sophisticated AI systems. Understanding these advancements will be crucial for staying ahead of cyber adversaries.
• OpenSSL Performance Still Under Scrutiny - Feisty Duck Limited 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The article discusses significant performance regressions in **OpenSSL version 3.x**, which was intended to modernize the project. This version introduced performance issues that made it unsuitable for high-volume deployments, especially as the previous stable version, **1.1.1**, was deprecated.
  
  **What Happened:**
  OpenSSL 3.x, upon its release, introduced substantial performance regressions, negatively impacting its usability for demanding applications. This issue was not widely discussed initially but was highlighted by developers, such as those at HAProxy, who advised against using OpenSSL 3.x for performance-sensitive tasks.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  **High-volume deployments** and any project relying on OpenSSL for performance-critical operations were affected. Indirectly, users and systems adopting OpenSSL 3.5.x for the upcoming shift to **post-quantum cryptography** (e.g., Debian 13, RHEL 10.1, Ubuntu 26.04 LTS) are also affected, as performance is crucial for these new, more computationally intensive algorithms.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  While the primary concern is performance, significant regressions can indirectly impact security by potentially leading to system instability or making it harder to maintain secure configurations under load. The article also emphasizes the importance of efficient implementations as the world transitions to post-quantum cryptography.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  OpenSSL 3.x exhibited performance regressions when compared to the older 1.1.1 branch. Insights from the inaugural OpenSSL Conference revealed that Juniper Networks tested versions from 1.1.1 through 3.4, and OpenSSL developers shared optimization tips for 3.x.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders should be aware of the performance regressions in OpenSSL 3.x and consider its suitability for their specific deployment needs, especially in high-volume scenarios. The transition to post-quantum cryptography will further highlight the importance of efficient cryptographic implementations, making the performance of libraries like OpenSSL a critical factor.
• NSO 2025 transparency report - NSO Group 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The NSO Group's 2025 Transparency and Responsibility Report marks a new phase for the company, characterized by new ownership based in the United States, strengthened governance, and a renewed focus on accountability. The report aims to showcase the company's commitment to human rights and ethical conduct within the cyber intelligence industry.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The report covers the year 2025, a period of transition for NSO Group with new ownership and leadership. The company emphasizes its ongoing efforts to balance advanced technological capabilities with human rights considerations and to strengthen its human rights compliance program.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  NSO Group's products, particularly its spyware Pegasus, have been implicated in the surveillance and targeting of activists, journalists, and other individuals. While the report focuses on NSO's internal processes and commitments, the broader context involves governments using these tools for intelligence and law enforcement purposes, raising concerns about potential misuse and impact on privacy and fundamental freedoms.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The core security implication revolves around the potential misuse of powerful surveillance technology. NSO Group claims its products are used lawfully to combat terrorism and serious crime, including breaking up trafficking rings and finding kidnapped children. However, critics argue that the company has a history of problematic customers and that its transparency reports lack verifiable data on how it handles such cases. The report itself highlights the company's efforts to implement safeguards against misuse, including a human rights compliance program and third-party audits.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  The provided information does not delve into specific technical details of the spyware or its operations. The focus of the reports is on NSO Group's governance, policies, and commitment to responsible business conduct.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders should be aware that NSO Group is actively promoting its transparency and responsibility efforts, particularly as it seeks to enter the US market. While the company highlights its human rights compliance program and internal reforms, critics suggest these claims may be more public relations than substantive change. Defenders should critically assess the verifiable data and examples provided in such reports, as they may lack the depth needed to fully understand the company's practices and the actual impact of its technology. It's also important to note that NSO Group has faced legal challenges, including a significant damages award to WhatsApp for a past spyware campaign 【1】. The company's transparency reports have also been criticized for containing fewer details in recent years compared to earlier ones 【2】.
• Gbyte leaks gigabytes of data - #F*ckStalkerware pt. 8 - The content posted at `https://maia.crimew.gay/posts/fuckstalkerware-8/` is controlled by **Maia Arson Crimew** . The website itself is described as her personal blog, featuring her investigative journalism, hacktivism, and technical articles . 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  A significant data leak has occurred from **Gbyte**, a company operating several stalkerware services including **SpyX, MSafely, and SpyPhone** 【1】. An unauthorized source gained access to Gbyte's backend systems, exposing a large volume of sensitive data 【1】.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The breach involved unauthorized access to Gbyte's backend systems, leading to the exposure of user account information, victim metadata, plaintext passwords for stalkerware accounts, and cloud credentials (iCloud/Google) for numerous victims 【1】. Data from other Gbyte services, such as a GPS spoofing app, an MMO boosting service, and a former Elden Ring rune shop, was also compromised 【1】.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  - **Users of Gbyte's stalkerware services** (SpyX, MSafely, SpyPhone) are directly impacted, with their account details and potentially their victims' information exposed 【1】.
  - **Customers of Gbyte's other services** have also had their order, revenue, user, and device data exposed 【1】.
  - **Gbyte itself and its founder, Xunde Cheng**, are central to this incident 【1】.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The primary security implication is the **widespread exposure of sensitive personal data**, including plaintext passwords and cloud service credentials 【1】. This significantly increases the risk of account takeovers, identity theft, and further exploitation of individuals 【1】. The incident highlights critical security flaws within Gbyte's stalkerware services, enabling unauthorized access to user and victim data 【1】. The use of Google OAuth for user registration by Gbyte is also identified as a potential business vulnerability 【1】.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  The breach was facilitated by vulnerabilities in Gbyte's systems, including publicly accessible reporting tools and an inadequately authenticated API 【1】. A critical discovery was a **plaintext GitHub API key**, which granted access to the source code for many of Gbyte's products 【1】. The article notes that the backends for these services share similarities, suggesting common vulnerabilities 【1】. The exposed data includes email addresses, usernames, plaintext passwords, and locations 【1】.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  - Individuals using services that might interact with Gbyte products should **change their passwords** for affected services and **enable two-factor authentication** where possible 【1】.
  - Companies like Gbyte must prioritize **robust security practices, secure data protection, and secure authentication mechanisms** 【1】.
  - It is noted that Gbyte and Xunde Cheng were contacted about these vulnerabilities but did not issue any patches before the article's publication, indicating a lack of immediate remediation efforts 【1】.
• getSPNless: Python tool to automatically perform SPN-less RBCD attacks. - The content posted at the URL `https://github.com/jarnovandenbrink/getSPNless` is controlled by **Jarno van den Brink** . 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The cybersecurity article details a Python tool named "getSPNless" that allows attackers to obtain Kerberos service tickets without needing a machine account, thereby bypassing typical security measures for Referential-to-the-Domain Controller (RBCD) attacks.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The "getSPNless" tool enables an attacker, using a standard user account, to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). The tool then extracts the TGT's session key and modifies the user's NT hash. By exploiting S4U2Self+U2U and S4U2Proxy functionalities, the attacker can subsequently acquire a service ticket for a specified Service Principal Name (SPN), effectively impersonating a legitimate service or user. This bypasses the usual requirement for machine accounts in Kerberos delegation attacks. 【1】
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  This technique impacts **Active Directory environments** that rely on Kerberos authentication. It is particularly relevant in scenarios where certain security configurations are in place, such as when `MachineAccountQuota` is set to 0, Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is unavailable, or PKINIT is disabled. The attack targets any user who can authenticate to the domain. 【1】
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The primary security implication is the potential for **privilege escalation and lateral movement** within a compromised network. Attackers can bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to resources or impersonate privileged accounts by obtaining service tickets without the need for a machine account. This could ultimately lead to a full domain compromise. 【1】
  
  **Technical Details:**
  - The tool employs an **SPN-less technique** for Kerberos ticket acquisition. 【1】
  - It is built upon exploiting **RBCD using a normal user account**. 【1】
  - The tool relies on the **`impacket` library**. 【1】
  - The process involves requesting a TGT, extracting its session key, and modifying the user's NT hash. 【1】
  - It utilizes **S4U2Self+U2U and S4U2Proxy** extensions to obtain the final service ticket. 【1】
  - The tool can accept either a user password or an NT hash. If an NT hash is used, password recovery is only possible if the "password never expires" flag is set. 【1】
  - The attack is contingent on the **RC4 Kerberos Encryption Type (Etype 23)** being enabled in the domain; it will not work if this is disabled. 【1】
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  - Defenders must be aware that this technique allows attackers to **bypass machine account requirements** for delegation attacks. 【1】
  - It is crucial to **monitor for unusual Kerberos ticket requests and modifications**, especially those originating from standard user accounts targeting critical services. 【1】
  - Ensuring that **RC4 Kerberos encryption is disabled** or at least closely monitored is important, as this attack relies on it. 【1】
  - While alternative methods like using machine accounts or shadow credentials with PKINIT/UnPAC-the-Hash exist, defenders should ensure these are **properly configured and monitored**. 【1】
  - Regularly auditing `MachineAccountQuota` settings and user account password policies (e.g., "password never expires") can help **mitigate risks**. 【1】
• EDRStartupHinder: EDR Startup Process Blocker - Zero Salarium 🔍 Show Kagi Synopsis
  The article "EDRStartupHinder: EDR Startup Process Blocker" details a technique and a tool designed to **prevent Antivirus (AV) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) services from starting** during the Windows initialization process. This method exploits the **Bindlink API** and the `bindflt.sys` driver.
  
  **What Happened:**
  The technique involves creating a service that starts with a higher priority than the target EDR service. This pre-starting service then utilizes Bindlink to redirect a critical DLL, essential for the EDR's operation, to a modified, unsigned version. Since many EDRs are protected by Protected Process Light (PPL) and are designed to self-terminate if they attempt to load an improperly signed critical DLL, this redirection causes the EDR to shut down before it can fully initialize and provide protection.
  
  **Who is Affected:**
  **Antivirus (AV) and EDR solutions** are the primary targets. The article mentions successful testing against Windows Defender on Windows 11 25H2 and several unnamed commercial EDRs. Consequently, any system running these security products is potentially vulnerable to this bypass.
  
  **Security Implications:**
  The most significant security implication is the **complete bypass or disabling of critical security software**. This leaves systems exposed to malware, unauthorized access, and other cyber threats that would typically be detected and prevented by the EDR. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to gain an undetected foothold on a compromised system.
  
  **Technical Details:**
  * The exploitation vector relies on the **Bindlink API** and the `bindflt.sys` driver to manipulate file system path redirections.
  * The technique targets **critical DLLs located in the System32 folder**, which are fundamental for the operation of most Windows processes, including EDRs.
  * The mechanism involves:
  1. Registering a custom service to run with a higher priority than the EDR service.
  2. Copying the original critical DLL to a different location and invalidating its signature (e.g., by altering the PE header).
  3. Using Bindlink to redirect the EDR's access to the original DLL to the modified, unsigned version.
  
  **What Defenders Should Know:**
  Defenders need to be aware of this technique that targets the startup process of security solutions. The reliance on file system redirection and the exploitation of DLL integrity checks highlight a potential weakness in how some EDRs handle critical system files during initialization. Understanding how Bindlink and `bindflt.sys` can be abused is crucial for developing more robust defenses against such evasion tactics.