InfoSec Briefing - January 21, 2026

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Good morning. This is your security briefing for Tuesday, January 20, 2026, covering 3 articles analyzed. All attribution is by the article authors. All article analysis is automated.

According to Alan Pope, malicious actors are hijacking expired domains of legitimate Canonical Snap Store publishers to distribute malware disguised as cryptocurrency wallet applications. The attackers use domain squatting to trigger password resets on publisher accounts, then push malicious updates that mimic apps like Exodus, Ledger Live, and Trust Wallet to steal users' recovery phrases and empty crypto wallets.

Check Point Research documents VoidLink, the first advanced malware framework created almost entirely by AI using Spec Driven Development methodology. A single developer used an AI assistant called TRAE SOLO to rapidly produce sophisticated malware with eBPF/LKM rootkits and cloud enumeration capabilities in under a week, representing a significant shift where individual actors can now develop nation-state-level malware using AI force multiplication.

SEQRITE reports on Operation Nomad Leopard, a targeted spear-phishing campaign against Afghan government entities and employees utilizing malicious ISO files and LNK shortcuts to deliver FALSECUB malware. The multi-stage infection chain establishes persistence and enables data exfiltration from compromised systems, demonstrating sophisticated espionage techniques focused on Afghan government and Taliban-associated entities.

That concludes today's briefing.

📰 Articles Covered

Malware Peddlers Are Now Hijacking Snap Publisher Domains - The content posted on the blog is controlled by **Alan Pope** .

A cybersecurity campaign is underway where malicious actors are publishing malware within the Canonical Snap Store, a platform for Linux software packages. This campaign has escalated with the perpetrators now hijacking expired domains of legitimate snap publishers to distribute malicious updates.

**What Happened:**
Scammers are publishing fake cryptocurrency wallet applications that mimic legitimate ones like Exodus, Ledger Live, and Trust Wallet. These malicious apps are designed to steal users' recovery phrases, leading to the emptying of their crypto wallets. Initially, these fake apps were published directly, but the scammers have evolved their tactics. They now register expired domains belonging to legitimate snap publishers. By doing so, they can trigger password resets for these publisher accounts and then push malicious updates disguised as legitimate software updates from a trusted source. This "domain squatting" tactic bypasses the scrutiny typically applied to new publisher accounts.

**Who is Affected:**
**Linux users** who install applications from the Canonical Snap Store, particularly those looking for cryptocurrency wallet applications. Users who have previously installed legitimate applications from publishers whose domains have expired are also at risk if those accounts are compromised.

**Security Implications:**
This campaign significantly undermines the trust users place in the Snap Store and established publishers.
- **Compromised Trust:** The hijacking of legitimate publisher accounts erodes the trust signal of publisher longevity and established history.
- **Financial Loss:** Users can suffer direct financial losses through the theft of their cryptocurrency.
- **Widespread Distribution:** The Snap Store hosts thousands of applications, making it a potentially wide-reaching distribution vector for malware.
- **Evasion Tactics:** The use of similar-looking characters from different alphabets and the "bait-and-switch" method (publishing an innocuous app that is later updated with malware) make detection difficult.

**Technical Details:**
- **Malware Functionality:** The malicious applications typically render a web page that mimics a legitimate crypto wallet interface.
- **Connectivity Test:** Before attempting to exfiltrate credentials, the malware performs a connectivity test by pinging a specific URL (e.g., `https://togogeo.com/trust.php`). If the connection fails, the application reports an error.
- **Data Exfiltration:** Analysis of network requests revealed a JSON response containing details about data being sent to Telegram, including a Telegram bot username (`pandadrainerbot`) and chat ID, indicating how stolen credentials might be communicated.
- **Snap Store Evasion:** Scammers use techniques like employing characters from other alphabets (e.g., Armenian letter Zhe 'ժ' instead of 'd') to bypass text filters. They also use a bait-and-switch approach: publishing a harmless app under an innocuous name, getting it approved, and then updating it with the malicious payload.
- **Domain Hijacking:** The new tactic involves monitoring for expired domains of legitimate snap publishers (e.g., `storewise.tech`, `vagueentertainment.com`), registering them, and then using them to reset passwords for the associated Snap Store accounts.

**What Defenders Should Know:**
- **For Snap Publishers:**
- **Maintain Domain Registration:** Ensure that domain registrations associated with your publisher accounts are kept current to prevent them from being hijacked.
- **Enable Two-Factor Authentication (2FA):** Implement 2FA on Snap Store accounts to add an extra layer of security against unauthorized access.
- **For Snap Users:**
- **Extreme Caution with Crypto Apps:** Be exceptionally wary of cryptocurrency wallet applications from any source, not just the Snap Store.
- **Verify Publisher and Updates:** Carefully check the publisher details and the last update time of any snap, especially wallet applications.
- **Direct Downloads:** It is strongly recommended to download cryptocurrency wallet applications directly from the official project websites rather than from app stores.
- **Report Suspicious Apps:** Utilize the "Report this app" feature on the Snap Store page for any suspicious applications found.
- **For Canonical (Snap Store Administrators):**
- **Address Domain Takeovers:** Implement measures to mitigate the risk of domain takeovers. This could include monitoring domain expiry for publisher accounts, requiring additional verification for dormant accounts, or mandating 2FA. The current situation is considered unsustainable.
VoidLink: Evidence That the Era of Advanced AI-Generated Malware Has Begun - hyperbole warning - "advanced" as opposed to human productivity enhanced - Check Point Research (CPR)

The emergence of **VoidLink** marks a significant shift in cybersecurity, signaling the beginning of an era where sophisticated malware can be developed using artificial intelligence by individual actors. This advanced malware framework was created almost entirely by AI, a stark contrast to previous AI-generated malware that was often linked to less experienced threat actors or mimicked existing tools.

**What Happened:**
VoidLink is identified as the first documented case of an advanced AI-generated malware framework. Its development process, termed Spec Driven Development (SDD), involved an AI assistant (TRAE SOLO) within an AI-centric IDE. The developer specified the project's objectives and provided an existing codebase, after which the AI generated a detailed development plan, including sprint schedules and coding guidelines for multiple teams. This plan then served as a blueprint for the AI to implement, iterate, and test the malware. Operational security failures by the developer exposed these development artifacts, providing clear evidence of the AI-driven creation process. A functional implant was reportedly developed in under a week. 【1】

**Who is Affected:**
While the article doesn't specify particular targets, the implications are broad. The ability of a single actor to rapidly develop sophisticated malware means that **organizations of all sizes are potentially at risk**. This advancement normalizes high-complexity attacks that were previously only feasible for well-resourced threat groups. 【1】

**Security Implications:**
The primary implication is that AI is becoming a powerful force multiplier for malicious actors. VoidLink demonstrates that AI can significantly amplify both the **speed and scale** at which sophisticated offensive capabilities are produced. 【1】 This development shifts the landscape from theoretical concerns about AI-enabled malware to practical realities, where advanced, stealthy, and stable malware frameworks can be created by individual developers, mimicking the output of experienced threat groups. 【1】 The rapid development cycle, with a functional implant generated in less than a week, highlights the increased threat velocity. 【1】

**Technical Details:**
VoidLink employs advanced technologies such as **eBPF and LKM rootkits**, and includes dedicated modules for **cloud enumeration and post-exploitation in container environments**. 【1】 The development methodology, SDD, involved using AI to generate a comprehensive plan, which was then used to guide the AI in writing over 88,000 lines of code within the first week of the project. 【1】 The development process was highly structured, with detailed documentation for sprint schedules, feature breakdowns, coding standards, and technical solutions, all generated or guided by AI. 【1】

**What Defenders Should Know:**
Defenders need to be aware that the era of sophisticated AI-generated malware has likely begun. 【1】 The ability of AI to enable individual actors to create complex systems at an unprecedented pace means that **high-complexity attacks are becoming normalized**. 【1】 A critical question for defenders is how many other sophisticated malware frameworks exist that were built using AI but have left no discernible artifacts, given that VoidLink's development story was uncovered due to rare visibility into the developer's environment. 【1】 This underscores the need for enhanced threat detection capabilities and a deeper understanding of AI's role in malware development.
Operation Nomad Leopard: Targeted Spear-Phishing Campaign Against Government Entities in Afghanistan - SEQRITE

**Operation Nomad Leopard** is a **targeted spear-phishing campaign** that has been identified by SEQRITE Labs APT Team, primarily affecting **government entities and employees in Afghanistan** 【1】.

**What Happened:**
The campaign involves attackers sending sophisticated spear-phishing emails with a malicious lure document designed to resemble an official Afghan government notice. The goal is to trick recipients into executing malicious payloads 【1】.

**Who is Affected:**
The primary targets are **Afghan government entities and their employees** 【1】. However, the threat actor's research suggests a potential expansion to target other countries as well 【1】.

**Security Implications:**
The campaign utilizes a multi-stage infection chain that includes a malicious ISO file to bypass security controls, a LNK shortcut file that displays a decoy PDF and establishes persistence, and a final payload named FALSECUB 【1】. The FALSECUB malware is capable of enumerating system information, discovering drives, and exfiltrating sensitive data, including files from the Desktop and Documents directories 【1】. The threat actor demonstrates a focus on Afghan government and Taliban-associated entities, indicating a potential for espionage or disruption 【1】.

**Technical Details:**
- **Malware:** The campaign employs a Trojan.Agentb (FALSECUB), Lnk.Trojan.50326.GC, and Lnk.Trojan.50327.SL 【1】.
- **Infection Chain:** It starts with a malicious ISO file, followed by a LNK shortcut file, and culminates in the execution of the FALSECUB malware 【1】.
- **Persistence:** The LNK file establishes persistence by creating a hardlink in the Startup folder 【1】.
- **FALSECUB Capabilities:** This C++ binary includes anti-analysis features and can connect to a command-and-control (C2) server to receive instructions. It can enumerate system information, discover drives, and exfiltrate data 【1】.
- **Data Exfiltration:** Data is often exfiltrated using a curl command with custom HTTP headers 【1】.
- **Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):** Specific hashes, IP addresses (104.18.38.233, 207.244.230.94), and domains (thepad0loc93x.ddns.net) are provided 【1】.
- **MITRE ATT&CK Techniques:** Tactics and techniques observed include Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Mark-of-the-Web Bypass (T1553.005), Startup Folder persistence (T1547.001), and data exfiltration over C2 channels (T1041) 【1】.

**What Defenders Should Know:**
Defenders need to be aware of the specific malware types associated with this campaign and the provided Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) 【1】. Understanding the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques used, such as spear-phishing attachments, bypassing Mark-of-the-Web, and establishing persistence via the Startup folder, is crucial for detection and mitigation efforts 【1】. The threat actor's focus on Afghan government entities and their research methods, including the use of publicly available documents as lures, should inform defensive strategies 【1】.